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[L.A. No. 22980. In Bank. Apr. 13, 
H. J. WILSON, Appellant, v. WILLIAM G. SHARP et 
Defendants; HAROLD W. KENNEDY, Respondent. 
[1] Appeal-Decisions Appealable-Orders on Motion to St.rike.-
An order granting motion to strike the only count of the 
complaint that purports to allege a cause of action against 
county counsel, so as to leave no issues to be determined 
between him and plaintiff, is appealable as a "final judgment." 
(Code Civ. Proc., § 963.) 
[2] Pleading-Waiver-Failure of Complaint to State Cause of 
Action.-Objection that complaint does not state cause of 
action is not waived by failure to demur and may be raised 
at any time. (Code Civ. Proc., § 434.) 
[3] Counties-Actions-Recovery of Money Unlawfully Paid.-
Gov. Code, § 26525, relating to recovery of county moneys 
paid out without authority of law, creates a cause of action 
against recipients of illegal payments, but does not create 
cause of action against county counsel or district attorney. 
[4] !d.-Actions-Recovery of Money Unlawfully Paid.-Refer-
ences in Gov. Code, § 26525, to payments ordered and made 
"without authority of law" or "without authorization by the 
board or law" show that decision as to whether the circum-
stances of a particular case warrant institution of proceed-
ings on behalf of county to recover money unlawfully paid 
involves determination of questions of law and fact, and such 
determination necessarily requires exercise of discretion by 
legal officer of county. 
[5] !d.-Actions-Recovery of Money Unlawfully Paid.-In exer-
cising his discretion whether to institute a suit under Gov. 
Code, § 26525, to recover money unlawfully paid, county coun-
sel must determine not only whether there has been a violation 
of law but also whether action is justified under all the facts, 
and public welfare requires that such decision should be made 
free from fear of civil liability. 
[6] !d.-Liability of Officers-County Counsel.-County counsel is 
immune from civil liability where he refrains from acting in 
a matter coming within scope of his authority, and where 
[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Appeal and Error, § 39 et seq.; Am.Jur., 
Appeal and Error, § 73. 
[3] See Cal.Jur.2d, Counties, § 84 et seq. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Appeal and Error, § 41; [2] Plead-
ing, § 278; [3-5] Counties, § 166; [6] Counties, § 82; [7] Coun-
ties, § 168. 
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his decision to act Ol' refrain from acting necessarily involves 
the exercise of discretion. 
[7] !d.-Actions-Recovery of Money Unlawfully Paid.-A count 
in a complaint alleging that county counsel failed, after de-
mand, to institute suit to recover salary paid an officer whose 
appointment was allegedly void fails to state a cause of action. 
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County granting a motion to strike from second 
amended complaint a second cause of action. Ellsworth 
Meyer, Judge. Affirmed. 
John J. Guerin for Appellant. 
Harold W. Kennedy, County Counsel (Los Angeles), John 
B. Anson and Arvo Van Alstyne, Deputy County Counsel, 
for Respondent. 
GIBSON, C. J.-Plaintiff, a taxpayer, seeks by this action 
on behalf of Los Angeles County to recover from defendant 
Sharp and several officers of the county the salary paid by 
the county to Sharp, to enjoin further payment of salary to 
him, and to obtain a judgment declaring the rights and duties 
of the parties. Defendant Harold W. Kennedy, County 
Counsel, was not named as a defendant in the original or 
the first amended complaint but was made a defendant for 
the first time in the second amended complaint. The sole 
basis for recovery alleged as to him appears in the second 
count of the complaint, which purports to state a cause of 
action only against him. The trial court granted a motion 
to strike the second count, and plaintiff has appealed from 
the order granting the motion. 
The original complaint and the two amended complaints 
allege as follows : The Los Angeles County Civil Service 
Commission called a promotional examination to fill a vacancy 
in the classified services and knowingly fixed the require-
ments so that only Sharp could qualify. The commission 
made an eligible list showing that Sharp was the only appli-
eant and determined his rating by investigation rather than 
by competitive examination. After certification by the com-
mission, the county clerk appointed Sharp to the position, 
and he was paid for his services out of public funds. It 
was further averred that the eligible list and Sharp's appoint-
ment were void and that the payment of public money to 
him was unauthorized. 
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barred by the statute of limitations at time this action 
was con~menced. He claims tllat the barred payments could 
have been recovered if timely suit had been brought by the 
eounty counsel. 
[1] The order granting the motion to strike operated to 
remove from the ease the only cause of action alleged against 
the county counsel and to leave no issues to be determined 
between him and plaintiff, and it was appealable as a "final 
judgment" within the meaning of section 963 of the Code of 
Civil Procedure.* (Yotmg v. Court, 16 Cal.2d 211, 
214-215 [105 P.2d 363]; Howe v. Key System Transit Co., 
198 Cal. 525 [246 P. 39] ; v. Bttellton Dev. Co., 58 
Cal.App.2d 178, 181 [136 P.2d 79:3] ; County of Hu.mboldt 
v. Kay, 57 Cal.App.2d 115, 119 [134 P.2d 501]; see Hen'-
scher v. Herrsche1·, 41 Cal.2d 300, 303-304 [259 P.2d 991] .) 
'l'he motion to strike vms made on the ground that specified 
allegations were irrelevant, and it was argued that the second 
cause of action attempted to set up, by way of amendment, 
a wholly different cause of action based upon a wholly dif-
ferent legal liability. It is unnecessary to consider whether 
the trial court should have granted the motion on the grounds 
stated because, as we shall see, the stricken matter fails to 
state a cause of action, and plaintiff was not prejudiced by 
the ruling. (See Wilson v. 194 Cal. 653, 659 [229 P. 
945]; Barr Ltlmber Co. v. Shaffer, 108 Cal.App.2d 14, 23 
[238 P.2d 99); Neal v. Bank of America, 93 Cal.App.2d 678, 
683 [209 P.2d 825].) [2] The objection that a complaint 
does not state a eause of action is not waived by a failure to 
demur and may be raised at any time. (Code Civ. Proc., 
~ 434: Horacek v. Smith, 33 Cal.2d 186, 191 [199 P.2d 929) ; 
Ryan v. Holliday, 110 CaL 335, 337 [42 P. 891].) 
The stricken cause of action seeks relief on the theory 
that section 26525 of the Government Code imposed on the 
-•section 963 of the Code of Civil Procedure reads in part, ''An appeal 
may Le taken from a superior court in the following cases: 
'' 1. Prom a final judgment. entered in an action, or special proceeding, 
commenced in a superior court, or brought into a superior court from 
another court; . . .. '' 
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county counsel a mandatory duty to institute proceedings 
to recover assertedly unauthorized payments to Sharp. Sec-
tion 26525 provides in part: ''If the board of supervisors 
without authority of law orders any amount paid ... and 
the money is actually paid, or if any county officer draws 
any warrant . . . without authorization by the board or law 
and the warrant is paid, the district attorney shall institute 
suit in the name of the county to recover the money paid, 
and 20 per cent damages for the use thereof." It is conceded 
that the County Counsel of Los Angeles County has the 
functions and duties of a district attorney under this statute, 
and we will discuss the problem as if the statute expressly 
mentioned the county counsel. 
[3] Section 26525 creates a cause of action against the 
recipients of illegal payments. (Miller v. McKinnon, 20 Cal. 
2d 83, 95-96 [124 P.2d 34, 140 A.L.R. 570]; County of Santa 
Barbara v. Janssens, 177 Cal. 114, 118 [169 P. 1025, L.R.A. 
1918C 558] ; see Galli v. Brown, 110 Cal.App.2d 764, 778-779 
[243 P.2d 920] .) It does not, however, purport to create a 
cause of action against a district attorney or county counsel, 
and we must consider whether, under general principles of 
law, an action will lie for failure to institute suit against 
the recipient of illegal payments. [4] The references in 
the statute to payments ordered and made "without authority 
of law" or "without authorization by the board or law" show 
that the decision as to whether the circumstances of a par-
ticular case warrant the institution of proceedings is a matter 
involving the determination of questions of law and fact. 
Such a determination necessarily requires the exercise of 
discretion, and it would seem obvious that the legal officer 
of the county is the proper person to exercise this discretion. 
(See Boyne v. Ryan, 100 Cal. 265, 267 [34 P. 707]. Compare 
Board of Supervisors v. Simpson, 36 Cal.2d 671 [227 P.2d 
14] [mandate granted where statute imposed nondiscretionary 
duty upon district attorney to bring abatement action when 
so directed by board of supervisors] . ) The Boyne case was 
decided when the statute on which section 26525 is based 
provided, in somewhat stronger language, that it was the 
"duty" of the district attorney to institute suit to recover 
illegal payments. It was nevertheless held that he was vested 
with discretion and could not be compelled by mandamus 
to bring suit. The same discretion is vested under the present 
statute. 
[5] In exercising his discretion, the county counsel must 
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determine not only whether there has been a violation of law 
but also whether action is justified under all the facts, and 
the public welfare requires that the decision should be made 
free from fear of civil liability. A clear analogy is to be 
found in the cases holding that officials who are directly 
connected with the judicial processes are immune from civil 
liability while acting within the scope of their authority. 
(White v. Towers, 37 Cal.2d 727, 729 et seq. (235 P.2d 209, 
28 A.L.R.2d 636] [malicious prosecution, fish and game in-
vestigator] ; Coverstone v. Davies, 38 Cal.2d 315, 322 [239 
P.2d 876] [malicious prosecution, sheriff] ; Turpen v. Booth, 
56 Cal. 65, 68 [38 .Am.Rep. 48] [grand juror] ; Downer v. 
Lent, 6 Cal. 94 [95 .Am.Dec. 489] [pilot commissioners, revo-
cation of pilot's license]; Norton v. Hoffmann, 34 Cal.App.2d 
189, 198-199 [93 P.2d 250] [malicious prosecution, city attor-
ney] ; White v. Brinkman, 23 Cal.App.2d 307, 311 [73 P.2d 
254] [malicious prosecution, district attorney] ; Pearson v. 
Reed, 6 Cal.App.2d 277, 280 et seq. [ 44 P.2d 592] (prosecut-
ing attorney].) [6] While the cases cited above concerned 
the question of liability for affirmative action, it would seem 
clear that the same rule of immunity should apply where, 
as here, the county counsel refrains from acting in a matter 
coming within the scope of his authority and where his deci-
sion to act or refrain from acting necessarily involves the 
exercise of discretion. [7] It follows that the second count 
of the second amended complaint fails to state a cause of 
action, hence plaintiff was not prejudiced by the order grant-
ing the motion to strike. 
The order is affirmed. 
Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Traynor, J., Schauer, J., and 
Spence, J., concurred. 
CARTER, J.-I dissent. 
The majority opinion holds that a county counsel (the 
same rule would apply to the district attorney if there were 
no county counsel) is not liable to the county for failure to 
take action for the recovery of county funds allegedly illegally 
paid to a third person, a county employee in this case. I 
assume, for the purposes of this dissent, as does the majority 
opinion, that the funds were illegally expended. The majority 
bases its conclusion on two grounds: (1) That it rests wholly 
within the discretion of the county counsel as to whether 
he will prosecute an action for the recovery of such funds, 
680 Wn,soN v. SHARP [42 C.2d 
and hence, he cannot be liable under any circumstances; 
( 2) "public welfare" requires that he be not liable by analogy 
to the cases (White v. Towers, 37 Cal.2d 727 [235 P.2d 209, 
28 A..L.R.2d 636]; Coverstone v. Davies, 38 Cal.2d 315 [239 
P.2d 876]; Turpen v. Booth, 56 Cal. 65 [38 Am.Rep. 48] ; 
Downer v. Lent, 6 Cal. 94 [95 A.m.Dec. 489]; Norton v. 
Hoffmann, 34 Cal.App.2d 189 [93 P.2d 250] ; White v. Brink-
man, 23 Cal.A.pp.2d 307 [73 P.2d 254]) holding that public 
welfare requires freedom on the part of certain officers in 
the performance of their duties from possible liability to 
third persons who are injured by their action or nonaction; 
and that the public's interest in having them fearlessly per-
form their duties outweighs the injury to third persons. 
The first ground is contrary to the holding of this court 
in Board of Sttpervisors v. Simpson, 36 Cal.2d 671 [227 
P.2d 14]. In that case the question was whether the district 
attorney could be compelled by mandamus to prosecute an 
action to abate a public nuisance. We held that while ordi-
narily a district attorney could not be compelled to prosecute 
a criminal case, because, whether or not he prosecuted it 
rested in his discretion, but that a mandatory duty was im-
posed upon him to abate a nuisance and he had no discretion 
in the matter. We said: ''As pointed out above, the district 
attorney must or shall bring an action to abate a public 
nuisance when so directed by the board of supervisors. (Code 
Civ Pro c., § 731, sttpra; Gov. Code, § 26528.) 'Shall' is 
mandatory (Gov. Code, § 14), and certainly 'must' is also. 
The writ of mandamus issues '. . . to compel the performance 
of an act which the law specially enjoins, as a duty resulting 
from an office ... ' (Code Civ. Proc., § 1085.) The statutes 
(Code Civ. Proc., § 731; Gov. Code, § 26528) specifically 
'enjoin' upon the district attoTney 'as a duty resulting from 
(his) office' the bringing of actions to abate public nuisances 
when directed by the board of supervisors." (Emphasis 
added.) Similarly, in the case at bar, section 26525 of the 
Government Code provides that if county money is illegally 
expended the district attorney "shall" (emphasis added) 
institute suit to recover it. The duty is mandatory. He has 
no discretion in the matter. Even if there is some discretion 
it would be in respect to the facts of the case-~whether 
they were sucl1 as to show an illegal expenditure. The plain-
tiff in this action alleged that he gave all the facts to the 
county counsel, and as far as appears, the county counsel 
arbitrarily refused to bring an action to recover the illegal 
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payments; his refusal was not an exercise by him of his 
discretion on the facts, but a failure to perform his official 
duty. 
Heliance is placed upon Boyne v. Ryan, 100 Cal. 265 [34 
P. 707}, as showing· the county counsel had discretion in 
the matter. It is not in harmony with the Simpson case 
and moreover the court said that if the district attorney 
"wilfully" refused to prosecute the action he could be pro-
ceeded against for malfeasance or nonfeasance in office. If 
that is true, certainly he should be liable to the county for 
his conduct. 
I cannot agree with the second ground. I reiterate the 
position I took in my dissents in White v. Towers, supra, 
37 Cal.2d 727, and Coverstone v. Davies, supra, 38 Cal.2d 
:315, that public office holding should not be a cloak immuniz-
ing the officer from liability for his wrongful acts. In addi-
tion to that, however, the rule of those cases cannot apply 
to the case at bar. In those cases, according to the majority, 
the public welfare was preserved by enabling the officers 
to perform more effectively their public functions, and to 
achieve that purpose they should be free from liability to third 
persons injured in the course of the performance of official 
duty; that the public welfare so preserved was of such superior 
importance that the rights of the injured persons must give 
way. In the case at bar, however, no such situation exists. 
Here it is obvious that the public interest would be preserved 
by recovering the county funds illegally spent, as opposed, at 
the most, to the public interest achieved in fearless failure 
of the county counsel to perform his official duty by refusing 
to take the necessary action to protect the public interest. 
In fact there is no public interest achieved in having official 
duty performed when such performance consists of a refusal 
or failure to bring an action to recover such funds. The 
only way to preserve the public interest here is by the prose-
cution of such an action. In short, it cannot logically be 
said that the public interest is preserved by the failure of 
public officials to perform their official duty. Therefore, the 
analogy between this case and the cited cases completely 
fails. Indeed, under the facts herA alleged, the public interest 
requires that the county counsel be held liable for failure to 
perform his official duty in prosecuting an action for the 
recovery of the funds allegedly illegally expended. 
r would reverse the judgment. 
